The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was the result of extensive negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 countries (US, France, Germany, UK, China, Russia, and the EU). The deal outlined limitations on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. A key aspiration of the agreement was that Iran would eventually evolve its peaceful nuclear program to a commercial scale, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.
Under the JCPOA, Iran committed to reducing its installed centrifuges from approximately 19,000 to 6,104, with only 5,060 enriching uranium for 10 years. In return, the UN Security Council would lift all nuclear-related sanctions from 2006-2010 on "Implementation Day," which would occur simultaneously with IAEA verification of certain preliminary Iranian obligations. The US would also terminate its own sanctions on Implementation Day, and further sanctions relief would be provided either 8 years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA and UNSC determined Iran's program to be entirely peaceful.
A significant point of contention was Iran's past nuclear work. Reports indicated that the deal might proceed even if UN inspectors could not conclusively determine whether Iran had pursued a nuclear weapons program. While the agreement mentioned addressing "possible military dimensions" (PMD) and giving IAEA inspectors greater access, including to sites like Parchin, there were concerns about the extent of these disclosures. An alleged draft agreement between the IAEA and Iran suggested a sequential arrangement for Parchin, involving Iran providing photos, environmental samples from specific locations, and using its own authenticated equipment for sampling, while the IAEA would ensure technical authenticity.
The JCPOA aimed to be endorsed via a UN Security Council resolution. It also required Iran to voluntarily submit to the Additional Protocol, which involves enhanced IAEA verification measures and pledges for greater access and advance notice for new facilities. Ultimately, Iran would seek parliamentary ratification and formally conclude both the Additional Protocol and the modified Code 3.1 of the Safeguard Agreement.
Despite the goals, the agreement faced criticism. Lawmakers expressed concerns that the US and world powers might never fully understand Iran's alleged past efforts to build an atomic weapon. Doubts also arose from the fact that Iranian explanations of past nuclear weapons research were initially deemed a requirement by the EU and IAEA for any deal, and Wendy Sherman, the US lead negotiator, had previously insisted on revealing possible military dimensions as essential for an agreement.
