Kazakhstan's oil exports have been severely impacted by the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, particularly due to repeated Ukrainian drone strikes on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) infrastructure. The CPC, which transports approximately 80% of Kazakhstan's total oil exports and accounts for roughly 40% of its national export revenue, has seen its capacity significantly reduced. The most damaging attack in November destroyed one of the terminal's three single-point mooring buoys and left another offline for maintenance, cutting offshore loading to a third of its capacity for nearly two months. This disruption, compounded by winter storms, led to a 19% drop in CPC exports from November to December and a nearly 20% year-on-year contraction in oil production in the first quarter of 2026, primarily at the Tengiz field. The Energy Ministry estimated January losses alone at $1.5 billion.
Kazakhstan has fewer westbound oil export routes than at any point since Russia's full-scale invasion. On May 1, Moscow closed the northern leg of the Druzhba pipeline to Germany, which carried over 2 million tons of Kazakh crude in 2025, citing "technical" reasons. While some of this volume is being redirected to the CPC, the Ukrainian attacks continue to degrade that channel. Kazakhstan has lodged a formal protest with Ukraine, calling the November strike "the third act of aggression against an exclusively civilian facility," but Ukraine rejected this, citing Kazakhstan's lack of protest against Russian attacks on its own infrastructure. Astana has also appealed to Washington and Brussels for help, given that EU member states absorb about 60% of Kazakhstan's oil exports and Western majors like Chevron (15% equity in CPC, 50% in Tengizchevroil), ExxonMobil (7.5% in CPC, 25% in Tengizchevroil), Shell, and Eni hold significant stakes and are absorbing considerable financial damage.
The strategic miscalculation by Ukraine, as suggested by analysts, is that targeting the CPC primarily harms Kazakhstan and Western companies rather than Russia. If the CPC were to stop entirely, Russia would forfeit roughly $600 million to $650 million annually in dividends and taxes, while Kazakhstan and Western majors could lose closer to $27 billion. Alternative routes like Atasu-Alashankou to China and Atyrau–Samara to Russia have seen marginal increases in shipments (50,000 tons and 255,500 barrels per day respectively), but their combined capacity is only about 20 million tons annually compared to CPC's 60 million tons. These alternatives require significant capital investment for modernization and additional pumping stations, and their netbacks are lower than via the CPC. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route is also limited by falling Caspian Sea levels, which hinder tanker operations. This situation highlights Kazakhstan's structural vulnerability as a landlocked country heavily reliant on transit routes controlled or affected by its neighbors.
