November 20, 2026 The U.S. Economy in Global Context Governor Lisa D. Cook At the XXIX Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, Santiago, Chile Share --> --> --> --> --> --> Watch Live Thank you, Governor Costa, for that kind introduction and for the invitation to deliver this keynote address and to participate in the 29th Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile today. 1 It is a distinct privilege to be back in Santiago. I first came to Chile between my second and third years as a Ph.D. student at Berkeley after completing a summer as an intern at the World Bank. I was on a quest to determine whether economic growth in Latin America or in another region of the world would be the subject of my dissertation. It piqued my interest in inflation targeting, a sound fiscal framework, and now, of course, how to think about the economic forces reshaping the global economy. I am grateful for the chance to continue to learn from your experience and to share some of my own thinking. I want to begin by acknowledging a fact that may seem obvious but is easy to overlook in the day-to-day work of setting monetary policy: The U.S. economy does not sit in isolation. As a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, my mandate is domestic—to promote maximum employment and price stability in the United States. But achieving that mandate requires that I pay careful attention to global developments, including economic and financial developments in Chile and across Latin America. The forces reconfiguring your economies are, in many cases, identical to the forces reconfiguring ours, even if they arrive on our respective shores somewhat differently. Geopolitics and Trade Let me start with geopolitical events. Over the past several years, the global economy has absorbed a remarkable sequence of shocks. Russia's war in Ukraine disrupted energy and commodity markets worldwide. The conflict in the Middle East pushed up energy prices again this year, and experts have warned that damaged infrastructure and depleted inventories could keep oil prices elevated for an extended period. These are not simply North American concerns. Oil is a globally traded commodity, and a conflict that drives up the price of oil in Houston drives it up in Santiago, as well. The precise transmission differs across countries, depending on whether they are net energy importers or exporters, but few economies have been insulated. A related story applies to trade. Over the past two years, the U.S. has raised tariffs on a wide range of imports, and considerable uncertainty remains about where tariff levels will ultimately settle. In the U.S., the effects of tariffs on inflation appear to have moderated, even as uncertainty about future trade policy persists. China, too, has increased trade restrictions, limiting exports of critical minerals for which it supplies a large fraction of the world's production. These minerals are a crucial input, and uncertainty is rising around the world about access to them. I raise this not to make a judgment about trade policy—that is not my role—but because such shifts inevitably reverberate across the global economy. When trade relationships between major economies are altered, other countries must decide how to respond: whether to deepen commercial ties elsewhere, reconfigure supply chains, or wait for greater clarity before committing to new investment. These are decisions playing out in boardrooms and finance ministries around the world right now, including, I suspect, in some of the economies represented in this room. The Global AI Buildout The third global force I want to highlight—and the one I will spend the most time on—is the extraordinary buildout of artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructure now underway around the world. While at the Board, I have spent much of my career as an economist studying innovation, including AI. Now, I spend considerable time talking with contacts in the U.S. and around the world about how AI is evolving and being used. I have spoken on several occasions about how I view AI—as a general-purpose technology, on par with or perhaps exceeding the steam engine, electrification, and the internet in its potential to transform how we work, innovate, and grow. This technology could bring a productivity boom unparalleled in generations. 2 At the same time, I worry deeply about our shared risks resulting from the technology, such as the specter of a painful labor market transition or cyber and financial-stability risks. Uncertainty abounds. In the U.S., AI has catalyzed a historic wave of investment. Companies have announced plans for more than $2 trillion in specific data center construction projects. So far, only a fraction of this has been realized. 3 This investment is already showing up in output data. And there is evidence of spillovers to other parts of the economy—in the price of chips and high-tech equipment, construction wages, and electricity costs. What I want to stress today is that this is not simply a North American phenomenon. By some estimates, roughly one-half of the world's data-center capacity now under construction is being built outside the U.S. 4 The AI buildout is a global undertaking, and it is reshaping economies—including economies in this region—in ways that are only beginning to be understood. Chile and its neighbors sit at an interesting intersection of this story. This country is the world's largest producer of copper and the second-largest producer of lithium—two minerals increasingly central to the infrastructure that AI requires, including power transmission and energy-storage systems. 5 This raises some questions to which I do not think any of us has a full answer. As demand for these minerals rises and falls with the pace of the global AI buildout, does this represent a new source of growth for resource-rich economies or a new source of volatility layered on top of already volatile commodity cycles? As capital flows toward AI infrastructure and related resource extraction around the world, what are the implications for smaller open economies managing capital flows, exchange rates, and financial stability? Corresponding to the buildout in physical infrastructure, adoption of AI tools by businesses and individuals is spreading quickly as well, albeit unevenly across countries. Recent work tracking the share of the working-age population using generative AI tools finds diffusion ranging from roughly 25 to 45 percent across higher-income economies, including Chile. These figures already exceed the pace of adoption we saw for personal computers at a comparable stage. 6 This matters a great deal for growth, because wider adoption of a general-purpose technology is ultimately how its productivity gains would be realized throughout an economy—gains that, in principle, could be sizeable. Simultaneously, researchers have raised questions about the distribution of gains across countries. Recent analysis from the International Monetary Fund suggests that advanced economies may be positioned to capture a disproportionate share of global AI-driven productivity growth over the next decade, relative to developing economies. 7 If this pattern holds, it raises important questions: Where in the distribution will countries like Chile wind up, and what might determine distributional outcomes? Finally, on the AI buildout, I would like to address AI and the labor market, the focus of today's conference. As with any major new technology, AI is likely to cause a shift in the labor market with jobs and job tasks being replaced by AI, and new jobs—many of which we cannot yet conceive of—being created. Ultimately, history has shown that human innovation will likely lead to a successful transition, with permanent job loss unlikely. However, I am very aware of the nonzero probability that this transition could take time and that job losses due to AI could precede new job creation. In the U.S., labor markets appear resilient to date, but AI adoption is still in its early stages, and I think it is too soon to feel comforted. We do see that some workers have already been affected by AI. For instance, there is already some evidence that labor demand has cooled for coding jobs in the software industry and in simultaneous translation. In addition, younger adults are experiencing prolonged job searches, which some attribute to nascent pressure from AI on entry-level positions. As AI adoption spreads, younger workers may continue to be disproportionately affected, and firms may need to take innovative and creative steps to train their future workforce. I am watching carefully the speed and acceleration of AI adoption across sectors and noting evidence of the changing mix of jobs within firms. New types of tasks and jobs are already being created, and I remain hopeful that job creation will be able to keep pace with job destruction. I will now turn to my outlook on the U.S. economy. U.S. Economic Outlook Overall economic growth in the U.S. is strong—and accelerating. The labor market remains solid, and, of great concern to me, inflation is well above the Fed's 2 percent target and has been for 67 months. I will start my forecast, as I typically do, with the price-stability side of our dual mandate, because, given the current state of the economy, this is my focus. Then, I will give my views on the path of monetary policy. One theme I want to emphasize is that waiting to act when a policy adjustment is required has a cost. Inflation Inflation, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, has exceeded the 2 percent target described in our framework for nearly six years. Based on U.S. inflation data released last week, it is estimated that the 12-month change in the PCE price index was 3.8 percent in October. The 12-month change in core prices—which exclude volatile food and energy costs—was 3.2 percent in October. The core measure underscores that, while energy is a