November 16, 2026 Some Potential Financial Stability Implications of Artificial Intelligence Governor Michael S. Barr At the Seventh Annual Association for Computing Machinery International Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Finance, Milan, Italy Share --> --> --> --> --> --> Watch Live Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. 1 This is the fourth speech I have given in the past year devoted exclusively to artificial intelligence (AI), and most of the others have also addressed it in some way. The effects of AI on people and economies around the globe are among the most important issues we are facing today. Let me stipulate at the outset that I am an optimist about the long-term promise of AI to empower individuals, businesses, and institutions across society. I remain hopeful that if we manage today's challenges and tomorrow's potential disruptions forcefully and effectively, that AI will lift up people, make them more productive, and broadly raise living standards—that most people will learn more and earn more. One of the reasons I'm optimistic about this technology is that I'm also optimistic about the capacity of society to understand and respond to the changes that AI will bring—to engage in a constructive dialogue about ensuring that the benefits from AI are not overwhelmed by the disruptions it will inevitably bring and the risks it may pose. This conference is part of that dialogue, directed at questions that I believe will be crucial in ensuring that AI is a positive force in the financial system that empowers individuals to better manage their finances and access credit and services, lowers costs and enhances the capabilities of financial service providers, and also makes markets function more effectively. But AI can only succeed in strengthening our financial system in this way if it also supports financial stability, something that is indispensable to a healthy economy. As has been the case for some time, there are important insights about AI and financial stability in the Federal Reserve's latest Financial Stability Report (FSR) issued on Friday. This edition of the twice-yearly report focuses on the AI investment boom and research by the Fed's staff to assess the degree of leverage in some of the innovative debt structures being employed to finance this growth. I will recap the report's findings and then turn to a discussion of what economic research can tell us about the benefits and risks of integrating AI into financial markets, focusing on wholesale trading. Next, I will examine the potential benefits and risks of AI's effect on cybersecurity and then finally consider what AI might mean for consumer and investor protection. The AI Investment Boom Anyone watching the news or their retirement plans these past couple of weeks is aware of the questions that investors have raised about the sustainability of the AI investment boom. I should issue the usual disclaimer here that policymakers on the Federal Reserve Board do not target levels of financial markets. Markets go up, and markets go down, and I assiduously avoid commenting on the ups and downs in markets. We do assess longer-term issues that relate to financial stability, and the latest FSR covers several. In a previous speech, I discussed three different scenarios summarizing the wide range of possible outcomes for how much AI could alter the economy. 2 In one possible scenario among several, even if AI turns out to be a transformative innovation that vastly improves productivity, a key question is whether investors will see returns on the AI buildout on a timeline and to an extent consistent with their expectations or whether a different outcome could lead to a significant repricing. The potential investment losses that could result from a large-scale repricing could lower output growth in two ways: first, from the direct effect of a drop in investment, which is a component of gross domestic product; and, second, from the knock-on effects of this loss of wealth in lowering consumer and potentially business spending. As discussed in the latest FSR, the equity premium, a rough measure of the additional return that investors require for holding stocks relative to risk-free bonds, is at low levels relative to historical norms, though not nearly as low as the levels reached during the dot-com stock market boom. 3 This is just one indicator to assess where broad measures of equity valuations are relative to historical norms. Leverage in the Data Center Buildout In addition to the question of equity valuations, the AI buildout has been increasingly funded by debt. The Federal Reserve's FSR delves into three ways in which the financing of AI data centers and related investments, which it calls "advanced computing debt," could affect financial stability: (1) the rapid growth of this debt, (2) circular financing networks, and (3) other complex financial obligations. In the case of a significant repricing of AI investments, stress from these three aspects of AI financing could amplify the repricing of AI investments. On-balance-sheet debt of the seven largest AI firms has been growing significantly in 2026 and is expected to exceed $800 billion before year's end. The growth of debt at these firms brings to mind the growth of debt in the telecom investment cycle of the late 1990s and early 2000s. The FSR compares hyperscaler firms' cumulative capital spending and debt issuance since 2020 with those of all firms in the telecommunications industry during the broadband investment cycle that started in 1995. While the hyperscalers have yet to surpass their comparators of the earlier boom, the recent acceleration in their capital expenditures suggests they may do so soon. 4 While these firms' on-balance-sheet debt levels have grown substantially, their other obligations, such as long-term contracts, lease commitments, and residual value guarantees, have grown even more rapidly. The FSR estimates that the potential maximum nominal value of these types of obligations, or off-balance-sheet liabilities, now exceeds $3 trillion. 5 A significant share of these obligations results from complex arrangements in which hyperscalers and other large firms with strong credit ratings indirectly support the financing of projects that involve other firms with weaker credit, or provide support for public utility investments. These off-balance-sheet liabilities include obligations relating to energy supply contracts, long-term data center and compute leases, and a wide variety of off-balance-sheet financing structures. As I have discussed in previous speeches, this financial complexity can be opaque to unsophisticated investors, and that opacity can exacerbate selloffs when investor sentiment shifts, as it is hard to know where risk resides. As a result, the development of these substantial off-balance-sheet structures warrants close monitoring. Perhaps just as important, in addition to the hyperscalers, lower-credit-quality firms most dependent on external funding have seen their cost of capital rise significantly in recent months and, as a result, are turning to more complex asset-backed financings. In addition, the hyperscaler firms and large graphics processing unit (GPU) producers also have over $100 billion in cumulative equity investments in large language model (LLM) labs and cloud-computing start-ups. These equity investments represent a form of "circular financing" in which hyperscaler firms and GPU makers invest capital in smaller firms, and the smaller firms turn around and use these funds to rent or purchase GPUs and compute from the firm that made the investment. These investments represent a relatively small share of the hyperscalers' and GPU producers' balance sheets, but they are critical for the smaller firms receiving the investments. For the AI buildout investments to ultimately become economically viable, the smaller firms will eventually have to replace that funding from their suppliers, the hyperscalers and GPU makers, with revenue from paying customers. Another indirect form of circular financing in which the hyperscalers and GPU producers support purchases of their products and services is the use of collateral guarantees for asset-based financings. As the firms most dependent on external financing bump up against financing constraints, they shift from issuing corporate bonds to issuing asset-based financing. To support the credit of these financings, the larger higher-credit firms often guarantee the resale value for the data centers or GPUs that are used as collateral to back the financings. These guarantees, or collateral backstops, are reported as off-balance-sheet liabilities because they represent the degree to which hyperscalers and GPU producers might absorb losses in the event of defaults and collateral liquidation. As we take a step back and consider the enormous scope of AI-related investment in capital stock, it is helpful to consider how it compares to that for previous technology cycles. By one estimate, the capital investment associated with the AI buildout could plausibly rival or even exceed the investments associated with previous infrastructure investment booms, including those associated with railroads in the 1870s, highways in the 1950s and '60s, and fiber-optic cable in the 1990s. 6 Each of these investment booms may have felt overbuilt at some point, but today we are glad to have the railroad, highway, and fiber-optic capacity that they put in place. Some of those earlier booms fizzled, with consequences for the broader financial system. Given the still-limited amount of debt backing the current boom, I'm less concerned about direct losses. However, with leverage at hedge funds and broader risk appetite apparently quite high, a sharp reversal could lead to rapid deleveraging and, potentially, self-reinforcing fire sales. Further, the leverage used in equity strategies has also increased in recent years. This